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  Free Trade Pacts have become an integral part of Singapore’s new commercial 
trade strategy which in turn is the cornerstone of the city-state’s larger international 
economic policy. Such trade pacts appear to be increasingly regarded by 
policymakers as effective and expeditious instruments for achieving trade 
liberalization among “like minded” trading partners. Of particular relevance is the 
Japan-Singapore pact which has recently been agreed to and is in the process of 
being implemented. The trade pact has been termed the Japan-Singapore Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JSEPA). This paper discusses the extent of the two 
countries’ bilateral economic linkages in terms of merchandise trade and trade in 
services and investments and examines available details of the JSEPA. 




  The spate of financial crises to have afflicted a number of developing and emerging 
economies over the last decade has inevitably given fodder to critics of economic globalization. To 
be sure, there is clear evidence that financial markets tend to react too late and when they do react, 
they have a propensity to over-react (Willett, 2000). Nonetheless, it is revealing to note that in 
almost all crises experiences, the economies initially and worst affected by the crises were also the 
ones with the worst fundamentals to begin with. On the other hand, even the strongest regional 
economies can be and have been affected by weaknesses in neighboring economies because of 
substantial trade, investment and financial interdependencies. Hence the term contagion is quite apt; 
like a spreading virus, agents with the weakest immune system to begin with are often the ones that 
are initially and often most severely impacted. This point is nicely illustrated in the case of East 
Asia using Table 1. It is apparent that, by most counts, Thailand which was the country first 
impacted by the regional crisis had the worst “fundamentals”. It was followed by Indonesia that was 
the most severely impacted by the crisis. In fact, despite being the most open economy in the region 
with a trade to GDP ratio of over 250 percent; Singapore was one of the few economies in East Asia 
to have maintained positive growth in 1998. By all indications the city-state boasted the region’s 
strong economic fundamentals (Rajan et al., 2002). It therefore provides one of the most convincing 
rebuttals against those who may argue that openness per se makes an economy especially 
vulnerable to sudden swings in market perceptions and capital account reversals. Rather, it is 
openness without the accompanying sound and stable institutions and coherent and consistent 
economic policies that is the source of acute economic vulnerability. 
  Despite having survived the regional crisis relatively unscathed, Singapore is faced with a 
number of challenges. The regional crisis has fundamentally altered the external economic 
equations that confront the city-state. The crisis and ongoing reforms in Southeast Asia, which 
remains rather sluggish in some countries (Rajan and Bird, 2001), appear to have slowed down the    4
 
pace at which some of Singapore’s neighbors are willing or able to undertake trade and investment 
liberalization. This is a far cry from the period of the mid 1980s to mid 1990s when there was an 
inherent regional dynamic towards more rapid - almost competitive - liberalization. While the term 
“contagion” has gained prominence - notoriety in fact - following recent financial crises, it should 
be recalled that it was used in a positive sense pre-crisis to describe the spread of trade and 
investment liberalization and economic prosperity in East Asia. Specifically, a positive externality 
of being associated with dynamic open economies involves the transformation of the conventional 
prisoner's dilemma - which suggests that protectionist policies are the “dominant strategy” for each 
country acting in isolation - to one of prisoner's delight, whereby trade liberalization is the dominant 
strategy for a country in a region in which some other countries are already reaping the benefits of a 
liberal trade regime (Garnaut, 1994)
1. There are genuine concerns that Southeast Asia has lost its 
economic vitality and is viewed by extra regional foreign investors as the “less attractive cousin” of 
Northeast Asia (Business Times, Singapore, December 11, 2000). Singapore is keen to ensure that 
investors not perceive it as being in the same boat as the rest of the region, i.e. Singapore needs to 
remain on the radar screen of world investors even if Southeast Asia as a whole may not be. 
Singapore also sees the need to diversify its economic linkages beyond Southeast Asia. This is 
especially so as the recent financial crisis appears to have depleted the collective strength and 
prominence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
2.  
  In view of the foregoing, as well as in recognition of the fact that the it has limited 
influence in the multilateral arena, where recent progress on many important issues relating to trade 
and investment liberalization is perceived to have been disappointingly slow and negotiations 
                                                           
1 Of course, an infinitely played prisoner’s dilemma game predicts that a cooperative strategy could be 
supported if agents have high enough rates of time preference (so called “Folk Theorem”). 
 
2 As reportedly noted by Singapore Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong: 
the crisis caused some ASEAN countries to hold back from pushing ahead with the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), to give struggling 
domestic industries some breathing space…ASEAN members who were doing relatively 
better -- such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei -- should take the lead and work 
to put ASEAN cooperation on track again (Business Times, Singapore December 1, 2000).     5
 
protracted and cumbersome (Sager, 1997), Singapore has actively looked for alternative paths to 
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation to complement its strong advocacy for 
multilateral liberalization. It is against this backdrop that Singapore has recently shifted its attention 
to cross-regional trading pacts. Such pacts, or Free Trade Arrangements (FTAs) as it has come to be 
known in common parlance, have become an integral part of Singapore’s new commercial trade 
strategy which in turn is the cornerstone of the city-state’s larger international economic policy
3. 
FTAs appear to be increasingly regarded by policymakers as effective and expeditious 
instruments for achieving trade liberalization among “like minded” trading partners (Schiff et al., 
2000). Formation of bilateral FTAs among such partners is also seen as a way to overcome the so-
called “convoy problem” whereby the “least willing member” (“foot-dragger”) holds the pace of 
trade integration back
4. While the argument that negotiating regional trade pacts are easier to 
conclude and can be done at a faster pace than global negotiations may not hold true as a general 
rule (Baldwin, 1997 and Bhagwati, 1995), it does seem to be relevant in the case of Singapore 
which sets strict deadlines for completion of discussions (though this may come with its own 
problems; see Rajan and Sen, 2002)
5. 
Singapore’s choice of trading partners to form FTAs can be broadly divided into two 
groups. The first group includes Australia, New Zealand, the EFTA countries, and the like. 
Individually, these countries do not account for more than 3 percent of Singapore’s total exports, 
                                                           
3 Given the definition of FTAs, Jagdish Bhagwati notes that term “preferential trade arrangements” (PTAs) is 
a more apt description. As he declares of such trade arrangements (Bhagwati, 1995), they are “two-faced: they 
embody both free trade and protection. Economists interested in the quality of public policy discourse should 
perhaps take a pledge henceforth to rename free trade areas as ‘preferential’ trade areas” (p.2). While 
sympathetic to this point of view, we use the terms free or preferential trade “agreements”, “arrangements”, 
“pacts” and “accords” interchangeably in this paper. 
 
4 Or, as is sometimes said, “those who can run faster should run faster and ought not to not be held back by 
those who choose not to run or do so at a snail’s pace”. 
 
5 Singapore’s drive towards FTAs is not solely economic by any means. FTAs could also serve as a conduit 
by which Singapore draws attention to itself and enhances the city-state’s political recognition and profile 
with the integrating partners and carves out for itself a pivotal role in regional and multilateral trade fora 
Singapore’s Ambassador-at-Large, Tommy Koh (2000) makes this point convincingly in the context of the  
proposed US- Singapore FTA.    6
 
domestic exports, or total imports (Rajan and Sen, 2002). The aim here is to seek out new markets 
in view of the seeming loss of growth momentum in Singapore’s immediate neighbors as well as to 
diversify the city-state’s external economic linkages. The second group of countries which includes 
the US and Japan, are major established trading partners. Proposed bilateral trade accords by 
Singapore with these two economies are best seen as a formalization of the de facto extensive and 
deep linkages that are already in existence.  
While the proposed  US-Singapore bilateral trade pact is certainly not without its 
insignificance (being the first such one that the US may sign with an Asian economy), of particular 
relevance is the Japan-Singapore pact which has recently been agreed to and is in the process of 
being implemented. While Singapore has already implemented a wide-ranging pact with New 
Zealand, this is the first trade pact that Japan has agreed to. It has been termed the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA). The significance of Japan’s shift in sole emphasis on 
the multilateral trading route ought not to be understated. Japan has hitherto been among the 
staunchest multilateralist and has long spurned the FTA route to trade liberalization. Just a few 
years ago in response to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the possible 
formation of a Free Trade of the Americas (FTAAs), Jagdish Bhagwati (1995) noted: 
(The US) is currently wedded to the wrongheaded approach supporting free trade 
agreements…I believe that Japan and the Far Eastern super performers could 
use..(the)..opportunity to play a leadership role in halting the US slide towards its 
obsessive fixation on free trade agreements and in restoring a principal focus on 
multilateralism at the WTO…Japan and the Asian nations have much to offer that 
is different from and wiser than what the US seeks (pp.15-6). 
 
In addition, rightly or wrongly, the JSEPA has been viewed as a precursor to the formation of an 
East Asia-wide FTA between economies in Southeast Asia plus Japan, Korea and China (APT) and 
is regarded by many as a possible template for other trade pacts in Asia
6. 
                                                           
6 In a recent meeting in Singapore, it was agreed that the APT would explore the possibility of holding an East 
Asian summit as well as consider the establishment of an APT-wide FTA and investment area (Business 
Times, Singapore, November 25, 2000). Steps are already underway to create an ASEAN-China FTA.    7
 
The next two sections discuss the extent of the two countries’ bilateral economic linkages in 
terms of merchandise trade (Section 2) and trade in services and investments (Section 3). This is 
followed by an examination of the available details of the JSEPA and how it may be expected to 
impact bilateral relations. The final section concludes the paper. Two technical annexes follow the 
main text. 
 
2.  Singapore’s Bilateral Trade Linkages with Japan 
2.1   Trends in Merchandise Trade 
According to available data from the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Japan was the 
world’s third largest trading nation in merchandise goods, accounting for 7.5 percent of global 
exports and 5.7 percent of global imports. Singapore ranked number fifteen in terms of world 
merchandise exports and sixteen in world merchandise imports, accounting for about 2 percent of 
global exports and world imports. One must keep in mind the entrepot nature of a large part of 
Singapore’s trade. Excluding this component, the city-state slips slightly to twenty three if only 
domestic exports (i.e. exports with a proportion of domestic value added) are considered (Table 2) 
7.  
Figure 1 displays trends in Singapore’s total merchandise trade with Japan over the past two 
decades (1980-2000). The share of Japan in Singapore’s overall trade during this period averaged 
14 percent, peaked at 16 percent in 1988, but progressively declined between 1995 and 1998. It 
currently stands at about 12 percent (year 2000). In contrast, trade with Singapore constituted a 
mere 3 percent of Japan’s global trade in 2000. Nonetheless, despite the city-state’s microscopic 
physical size, Singapore was the sixth largest export market for Japanese goods and Japan’s 
thirteenth largest import source in 1999 (IMF, 2000). Singapore’s exports to Japan as a share of 
Singapore’s global exports declined from 11 percent in 1992 to less than 8 percent by 2000. Nearly 
one third of Singapore’s exports to Japan have included a entrepot component. On average, Japan 
                                                           
7 Note that this ranking excludes Singapore’s trade with Indonesia which the Singapore authorities do not 
publish.    8
 
constituted about one fifth of Singapore’s total imports. Averages fail to capture the entire picture as 
imports from Japan declined from 21 percent of Singapore’s global imports to 17 percent during the 
period under consideration. All in all, there appears to be a clear trend of declining relative 
importance of Japan in Singapore’s aggregate trade basket, though it remains a major trade partner 
of the city-state.  
While Singapore has maintained large aggregate trade surpluses, as with most other Asian 
countries, it has run persistent bilateral deficits with Japan which have been increasing both in 
magnitude as well in terms of Singapore’s total trade with Japan, especially during the period 1985-
94. The deficit was around US$ 13 billion in 2000, constituting about almost 40 percent of 
Singapore’s bilateral trade with Japan. Persistent trade deficits with Japan might at least partly be a 
reflection of the inability of foreign (including Singapore) exporters to penetrate the Japanese 
market due to the maintenance of both official and (especially) unofficial non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
(Lawrence, 1987). Indeed, these barriers have in turn often led to the accusation that Japan “imports 
too little” from its trading partners (Takeuchi, 1989), with a survey of Singapore exporters in the 
late 1980s revealing them to be “generally overawed by the Japanese ‘closed market’ image” (Lim, 
1988, p.100). This factor could be of potential importance, as a bilateral trade pact ought to provide 
Singapore preferential access to the Japanese market.
8.  
 
2.2 Trade  Intensity  Indices 
While certainly informative, trade shares are an incomplete indicator of the intensity of 
bilateral trade relations as they do not take into account a country’s trade exposure with the rest of 
the world. The degree of bilateral orientation of Singapore's trade with the two partner countries is 
                                                           
8  The assemble-and-export strategy, whereby Japanese multinationals in East Asia import intermediate 
products and capital goods from Japan assemble them locally and re-export the finished goods to the US and 
other third countries, is a further reason for Japan's persistent bilateral trade surplus with Singapore as well as 
the rest of East Asia It is this phenomenon that is thought to have contributed to an increase in Singapore’s 
imports from Japan particularly after 1987-88, with the city-state being one of the largest recipients of 
Japanese FDI due to various push factors in Japan (Rajan, 1996a).    9
 
therefore more appropriately examined with the aid of bilateral trade intensity indices. These 
indices aim to capture the extent to which the home country (Singapore) regards its trading partners 
(Japan) as being important in relation to the former’s trade with the rest of the world (ROW). An 
index value above unity indicates that the trading partner is relatively “over-represented” in the 
home country’s trade
9. 
Singapore’s trade (exports plus imports) intensity indices with Japan over the period 1980-
99 are highlighted in Figure 2a and 2b. As can be seen, the index values are generally above unity, 
indicating an “over-representation” of Japan as a market for Singapore’s exports as well as sources 
of imports. Singapore’s average trade intensity with Japan is 1.9 (Figure 2a), mainly because of the 
relatively high import intensity. Conversely, from Japan’s perspective, its average export intensity 
with Singapore is fairly high at 2.4 (Figure 2b). Yet Japan’s import intensity with Singapore is less 
than 1, implying that Singapore is under-represented as an import source for Japan. Overall, the 
intensity of Japan’s total trade with Singapore was 1.7.  
 
2.3  Commodity Composition of Merchandise Trade  
The preceding analysis focuses only on broad trends in aggregate trade relations. An 
examination of the commodity composition of trade is necessary to obtain a fuller understanding of 
Singapore’s trade linkages. 
Table 3 compares the composition of Singapore’s overall exports and exports to Japan 
specifically by commodity groups at the SITC 3-digit level in 1999 which is the latest available 
year. Singapore’s global exports are concentrated in five product categories, viz. electronics and 
petroleum refined products (SITC 776, 752, 759, 334 and 764), which constituted nearly 60 percent 
of Singapore’s total world exports
10. The top five product categories of Singapore’s overall exports 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 See Annex 1 for details. 
 
10 This trend is similar over 1995-99, indicating that the crisis of 1997-98 has not had any discernible adverse    10
 
noted above are also among the highest categories of Singapore’s exports to Japan, accounting for 
over half of the city-state’s total exports to Japan
11. Electronic Valves (SITC 776) accounted for 
about 20 percent of Singapore’s global exports as well as exports to Japan specifically, making it 
the second most important Singapore export to both markets. Data Processing Machines (SITC 752) 
was the second most important Singapore export globally but was the most important one to Japan. 
Table 4 documents the commodity composition of Singapore’s imports from Japan in 1999. 
While Electronic Valves (SITC 776) remains the top ranked product in Singapore’s overall imports, 
constituting nearly one fifth of the total, the import shares of other electronic products and refined 
petroleum products are much smaller than their corresponding export shares. For instance, SITC 
752 (Data processing machines), which has constituted nearly a fifth of Singapore’s exports to 
Japan, has only been about 4 percent from Japan. Refined petroleum products do not figure at all in 
the top ten items of imports from Japan. This notwithstanding, seven commodity groups, six of 
them in the categories of electrical and electronic goods and equipment (i.e. SITC 75-77), are also 
among the top ten commodities of both Singapore’s overall exports and imports. Five out of these 
seven product groups overlap in Singapore’s exports to and imports from Japan (particularly 
domestic exports) to and imports from Japan viz. SITC 752, 776,759, 764 and 772. All this suggests 
a priori a high presence of intra-industry trade (IIT). 
 
2.4 Intra-industry  Trade  (IIT) 
Broadly, IIT refers to the simultaneous import and export of products within the same 
product category. The most common measure of IIT is the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index which 
computes the ratio of net exports in a product category to its total trade in an index that takes values 
from 0 to 100. In other words, the G-L index is a measure of the degree of trade overlap between 
exports and imports in a given product category or industry. The G-L index takes on a value of 0 if 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
impact on the commodity composition of exports. 
11 This result remains unaltered even if periods prior to the crisis in 1997-98 are considered.     11
 
there are no exports or imports of a particular product group, i.e. no IIT. If exports exactly match 
imports, both being positive, the G-L index value equals 100 (Annex 2). The index can be 
computed at the aggregate trade level as well as a weighted average of IIT in all industries, the 
weights based on the share of the industry’s trade in the country’s total trade. Despite the 
widespread use of the G-L index, it is not without its problems. For instance, since the G-L index is 
unable to account for aggregate trade imbalances, it tends to bias downwards the actual intensity of 
IIT with countries with which bilateral trade is unbalanced (see Rajan, 1996b and references cited 
within) Accordingly, we also provide data on the actual amount/value of IIT as well as make use of 
data on both total exports as well as only domestic exports. 
Estimates of the G-L index and the actual level of IIT in Singapore’s trade with Japan over 
1995-99 using total and domestic exports are respectively presented in Table 5 and 6. Since the 
preceding section has emphasized that the Singapore’s bilateral trade with the two countries is 
concentrated in the SITC 3-8 commodity groups, we focus on these categories at the 3-digit 
disaggregated level. The G-L index for trade between Singapore-Japan trade has increased from 31 
in 1995 to 40 by 1999. However, except for SITC 759 in the case of Singapore-Japan IIT, each of 
the other product categories were among the top ten index values, accounting for only 4 percent of 
bilateral trade with Japan). This highlights the need to carefully differentiate between levels or 
volumes and degree of IIT. The G-L index is a measure of the latter. It is therefore important to 
consider the actual level of IIT (Rajan, 1996b). The total value of Singapore-US IIT stood at US$ 
17 billion. The top four products to have experienced the highest levels of IIT are SITC 776, 752, 
759 and 764. These constitute two fifths of Singapore’s total value of IIT with Japan. Over the 
period, notwithstanding the crisis years of 1997-1998, most of the products maintained their 
rankings with respect to the level of IIT.  
Does exclusion of the entrepot component of Singapore’s trade with these countries lead to 
any significant alteration in the above conclusions? The G-L index values using domestic exports 
are lower for IIT, declining from 40 to 30 in 1999 (Table 6). This is a reflection of the higher    12
 
proportion of Singapore exports to Japan being entrepot related as previously noted. There was no 
variation in IIT over the period under consideration. As such, the observed increase in Singapore-
Japan IIT when using total exports has been entirely due to increasing trade with other countries in 
the region, with Singapore being used as a transshipment point.  
 
3.  Trade in Services and Direct Investment 
3.1  Importance of Services Trade to Japan and Singapore 
An important structural change facing many economies, both developed and developing, is 
the rapid expansion of the services sector and its rising prominence in their production and 
employment structures. In many countries, including Singapore and Japan, the services sector has 
become the largest contributor to GDP (between 60 and 70 percent) (The World Bank, 2001 and 
Table 7).  
The services trade sector is inherently more complex than merchandise trade. 
Consequently, its regulation and liberalization is particularly challenging. Data problems in services 
trade are especially acute since available data are not comprehensive, detailed, timely or even 
internationally comparable
12. Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the revolutions brought about by 
the introduction of innovations in information and communications technologies (ICT) and 
telecommunication that has been a vital factor in increasing the importance of service transactions 
in the global economy. Many services are becoming increasingly internationalized. In fact, “the 
internationalization of services is viewed as being at the core of economic globalization” (Primo 
Braga, 1996). Commercial services accounted for nearly one fifth of world trade and an estimated 
three fifth of global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in 1996. In view of its increasing 
importance, a multilateral framework for liberalizing trade and investments in the services sectors 
                                                           
12 Continued omission of services trade in such empirical analysis is becoming progressively more glaring in 
view of its mounting importance in global output and trade.  
    13
 
was conceptualized in the form of General Agreement Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS 
negotiations were initiated under the aegis of the WTO as part of the Uruguay Round
13. 
  There is no known source of data on bilateral service trade in Singapore and Japan. 
However, in order to understand the importance of services trade in both countries, it would be 
useful to analyze the trends in overall services trade and its composition in Singapore and Japan. 
Table 7 provides this information over the period 1991-98. Singapore’s overall service exports 
increased significantly from US$ 14 billion to over US$ 30 billion over 1991-97
14, while service 
imports more than doubled from about US$ 9 billion to almost US$ 20 billion over the same period. 
Overall, Singapore maintained an aggregate surplus in service trade. ICT and related services 
constituted the bulk of Singapore’s service exports during the entire period (nearly a half of the total 
1998), followed by Travel and Transport services. Japan has been a relatively more important 
player in services trade. Its service exports were nearly four times while its service imports were 
nearly six times that of Singapore in 1998. Specifically, its services exports increased from US$ 45 
billion in 1991 to almost US$ 70 billion by 1997, thereafter declining in 1998 due to the regional 
financial crisis
15. A similar trend was noted for service imports. Unlike Singapore, Japan’s services 
trade has been in deficit over the same period.  
The WTO defines services trade in terms of trade in “commercial services” specifically. 
The commercial services category in the WTO in turn is defined as services minus government 
services, n.i.e. (not included elsewhere) (WTO, 2001a, p.216). Commercial services are further sub-
divided into transport, travel, and other commercial services (including communication, 
construction, financial, insurance, computer and information services and other business services). 
According to the WTO rankings of commercial services trade, Japan ranked fifth in global exports 
                                                           
13 For a recent general discussion of the growing importance of services trade worldwide and various 
approaches to liberalization of trade in services, see the WTO (2001b, chapter IV: 5) and Prieto and 
Stephenson (1999). 
 
14 According to MTI (2002), services exports of Singapore were worth US $ 27 billion in 2000. 
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of commercial services and third in global imports of commercial services, accounting for 4.8 
percent of world service exports and 8.1 percent of world service imports, respectively. This 
indicates Japan’s position as a leading country in trade of commercial services. Singapore ranked 
fifteen in the global export of commercial service and eighteen in the case of imports, accounting 
for about 1.9 percent of world service exports and 1.5 percent of world service imports, respectively 
(Table 8). Therefore, while Japan’s ranking is more or less similar in both world merchandise trade 
and in world trade in commercial services, Singapore’s ranking is much higher in the former 
compared to that of the latter. While services trade has been gaining importance for both Singapore 
and Japan, ICT related services are especially prominent in their respective trade baskets, as are 
Travel and Transport services. 
 
3.2  Strategies to Develop Singapore into an International Services Hub 
  Singapore aims to strengthen and consolidate its position as a regional and global services 
hub, particularly in trade logistics, financial services, media and entertainment, and educational and 
training services. It plans to achieve this goal while simultaneously moving to higher value added 
manufacturing. More specifically in this regard, the strategies pursued by the Economic 
Development Board of Singapore (EDB) in developing the services hub of Singapore relate to its 
objectives set out in the Industry 21 (I21) plan launched in January 1999. These broadly include: 
boosting manpower and skills in knowledge-based industries (viz. information technology and 
media, e-commerce, supply chain management); encouraging overseas companies to set up their 
headquarters in Singapore under the Overseas Headquarter/Regional Headquarter (OHQ/RHQ) 
scheme to gain from new business opportunities; facilitating the promotion of innovation and R&D 
in the production process for local companies using IT-related applications, besides identifying 
opportunities for investments overseas in emerging and fast-growing markets (EDB, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 According to MTI (2002), Japan’s imports of commercial services in 2000 were about US$ 115 billion, 
while its exports of commercial services were worth US $68 billion.    15
 
Of these strategies, the one that has been actively targeted by the EDB for development of 
the services sector has been its OHQ/RHQ schemes as a part of its International Business Hub 2000 
(IBH2000) strategy. The IBH2000 strategy was based on the fact that key economic activities 
involved in the services sector, viz. transportation, finance, telecommunications, and information 
technology functions are concentrated in a few strategic centers in the world, and that Singapore 
could secure a first mover advantage in this area by planning ahead and investing in human capital 
and infrastructure to have a competitive edge (Chia, 1998). The OHQ/RHQ schemes under this 
program were aimed at inviting international businesses to set up their regional headquarters or 
operational headquarters under a RHQ/OHQ scheme
16. Of the twenty seven companies establishing 
their HQs (both RHQs and OHQs) in Singapore in 1999, fifteen were from the US, and six each 
were from Europe and Asia
17. The HQs cut across diverse industries, including chemicals, 
electronics, engineering, life sciences, logistics/supply chain management, hospitality, information 
and communication technology and media services. Eight HQs were subsidiaries of Fortune Global 
500 companies including Cisco Systems, Unilever, Lucent Technologies, Chevron and Honeywell 
(Singapore Investment News, April 30, 2000). 
 
3.3  Singapore’s Investment Linkages with Japan 
  Investments in the services sector play a major role in the area of trade cooperation, an 
issue that we now briefly turn to. 
Singapore’s ability to attract substantial Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows has 
transformed it into an important manufacturing base for foreign multinationals and a major 
international financial, logistics, trading and transportation hub
18. The stock of Singapore’s direct 
                                                           
16 RHQ is defined as intermediaries between corporate headquarters or and country branches located across a 
region (Avenell, 1996). Its main role is that of coordination, control and planning of business functions. 
 
17 Although the exact number is not known, it can be safely assumed from past trends that most of the Asian 
companies establishing HQs were from Japan. 
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inward equity investment increased more than five-fold from US$ 14 billion in 1987 to US$ 75 
billion by 1998. Among the major countries that invested in Singapore, the US, Japan and the EU 
together accounted for over half of total inward direct investment in 1998 (Table 9). The US has 
been the single largest foreign investor in terms of investment commitments in both Singapore's 
manufacturing and services sectors. Japan is the second largest investor in Singapore’s 
manufacturing sector. In 1998, the stock of Japanese direct investments in Singapore amounted to 
US$ 13 billion or almost one fifth of the total stock of Singapore’s direct foreign equity 
investments. Japan’s investments in the services sector were only about US$ 47 million in 1997 or 5 
percent of the total investment commitments in this sector (Figure 3). On the other hand, 
Singapore’s investments in Japan have been relatively low, less than US$ 300 million in 1998, 
barely 1 percent of the city-state’s total outward investments. However, in 1999, Singapore 
investments increased their share to about 3 percent of total inward FDI in Japan (Ministry of 
Finance, Japan, 2002).  
Figure 4 and 5 capture trends in Japan’s inward and outward FDI in both the manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing (i.e. service) sectors in Singapore. Japan’s inward investments from 
Singapore decreased between 1989-1995 but peaked next year due to a sudden spurt of inflows into 
the non-manufacturing sector. It declined thereafter due to the regional financial crisis in 1998 but 
increased again in 1999. Conversely, Japan’s outward investments into Singapore have shown a 
distinct downward trend compared to the early 1990s (Figure 5). Overall, Japan’s investments in 
Singapore have been much higher than Singapore’s investments in Japan, and have also been more 
evenly distributed across manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. However, the services 
sector has remained an important target for Japanese and Singapore investors in one another’s 
countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 In 1999, FDI inflows in the manufacturing sector accounted for almost 80 percent of total direct investment 
inflows (EDB, 2000).    17
 
4.  Overview of the Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
19 
 
  Having outlined the degree of existing bilateral economic linkages that exist between 
Singapore and Japan, this section offers an overview of some of the main elements of the JSEPA 
(commonly dubbed the “New Age Economic Partnership”) and their possible implications for 
bilateral ties.  
The idea of a JSEPA was first mooted in December 1999 by the Singapore Prime Minister, 
Goh Chok Tong to his Japanese counterpart. A Joint Study Group was established to study the 
viability of the proposal. The group completed its work in September 2000 and the governments of 
Japan and Singapore entered into formal negotiations on a trade pact in October of that year. 
Following a series of negotiating rounds, the Agreement was signed in January 2002 in Singapore. 
The Agreement comprises a number of elements pertaining to the liberalization and facilitation of 
trade in goods and services and investment flows as well as a number of other elements dealing 
with broader economic cooperation. We discuss some of the main elements of the agreement below. 
 
4.1  Trade in Goods 
  Tariffs: The JSEPA eliminates tariffs on goods covering 98.5 percent of current trade 
between the two countries, much higher than the WTO zero-tariff commitments, which currently 
covers about 65 percent of current Japan-Singapore trade (Table 10). Singapore has committed to 
grant zero-tariff treatment on all imports from Japan. In turn, Japan has more than doubled its zero-
tariff commitments to Singapore from the current 34 percent to 77 percent of total tariff lines. While 
preferential tariff-free market access has been granted to an extensive range of products, agriculture 
is the one area where tariff concessions have lagged because of the extreme political sensitivity of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 This draws on MTI (2001) as well as various media reports on the topic, including Low and Choong 
(2002).    18
 
this sector in Japan, on the one hand, and its relative unimportance to Singapore, on the other. Both 
countries are prohibited from maintaining any export duties that may distort bilateral trade
20.  
Customs Procedures and Paperless Trading: As tariff barriers have progressively come 
down worldwide, focus of trade agreements (bilateral, regional and multilateral) has shifted to other 
potential barriers to the flow of goods that may restrict market access opportunities. Complex and 
non-uniform customs procedures are seen as a significant hindrance to the movement of goods 
across borders. The JSEPA commits both countries to improve the speed and efficiency of customs 
clearance of goods on a mutual basis by streamlining and simplifying existing procedures and via 
the use of informational technologies. In relation to this, the countries have agreed to replace the 
current paper-based supporting trade documents which are typically required for goods to be 
cleared with more cost-effective electronic versions. Steps will be taken to ensure that the necessary 
infrastructure is put in place to support “paperless trading”. 
Mutual Recognition: Differences in testing and certification standards is another important 
barrier to the trade in goods across borders. In recognition of this, both countries have agreed to 
take steps to ensure the mutual recognition of test results and certification by accredited conformity 
assessment bodies in either countries. Once this is in place, exporters can have their products tested 
and certified by assessment bodies locally and not have to duplicate the procedures in the importing 
country. All of these are bound to reduce delays in cross-border transactions, hence facilitating 
bilateral trade. Specific focus of the agreement is on electrical and electronic and telecom products 
which is a major area of bilateral trade (discussed in Section 2) as well as pharmaceuticals. The 
latter is not only an area of growing importance in terms of bilateral trade but is also of strategic 
relevance in view of the rapidly ageing populations in both countries.  
 
4.2  Trade in Services 
                                                           
20 As with all trade agreements, the JSEPA also discusses rules of origin (ROOs) to prevent the transshipment 
of goods from third countries. We do not discuss these provisions here.    19
 
As noted, the services sector is of particular significance to both economies. The JSEPA 
therefore discusses a number of provisions for the liberalisation and facilitation of transactions in 
this sector. To begin with, the agreement vastly increases the commitments by both countries well 
beyond those agreed under the WTO (over 130 sectors in both cases). Much more than in the case 
of trade in goods, non-tariff and non-quantitative barriers hinder cross-border services trade. 
Accordingly, steps have been taken to ensure that “behind the border” impediments to trade and 
investment flows (i.e. trade facilitation measures) have also been addressed. The committed sectors 
are subject to market access, national treatment and domestic regulation disciplines. Given the 
degree of internationalization of the Singapore economy, the JSEPA has been extended to include 
permanent residents and multinational firms, which have “substantive business operations in 
Singapore”. While a number of services sectors are expected to benefit from the agreement, it is 
noteworthy that four sectors have come in for special attention. 
Tourism: In an effort to promote the tourism sectors in both countries, the JSEPA has 
proposed the establishment of a Joint Committee on Tourism. More concretely, the countries have 
agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the twinning of Ginza and Orchard Road 
which are the premier shopping districts of Japan and Singapore, respectively. The aim of this is not 
only to promote the two areas to one another’s citizens and those in third countries but also to 
undertake joint promotions and special events to showcase the arts and cultures of both Asian 
countries. 
Information, Communication Technology (ICT): Both Japan and Singapore are among the 
leaders in ICT trade and its day-to-day utilization. Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the depiction 
of the JSEPA as being “New Age” is its emphasis on cooperation and facilitation of this sector. The 
JSEPA has put in place steps to: (a) fortify the market access in Japan for Singapore-based 
businesses delivering ICT products and services and vice versa; (b) augment the knowledge of 
business environments in both countries and a provide a more level playing field for businesses 
dealing in Telecommunication Services; (c) reduce technical and technological obstructions to ICT    20
 
trade; (d) offer additional and alternative route to orderly Dispute Settlement; and (e) catalyze and 
facilitate the ongoing expansion of e-Commerce transactions. 
Broadband: Cooperation in the area of media and broadcasting has also been identified as a 
key area of cooperation in which Japan and Singapore can help one another in the development and 
provision of innovative media and broadcasting technologies.  
Financial Services: Singapore, Tokyo and Hong Kong are the three important financial 
centers in Asia. In an effort to given one another’s financial sectors a boost in terms of turnover and 
cost efficiency, the JSEPA has put in place a number of initiatives to enhance bilateral cooperation 
to promote financial sector and capital market development. 
 
4.3  Investment Facilitation and Movement of Natural Persons 
  As noted previously, Singapore is highly dependent on FDI and Japan is the second largest 
investor in the city-state. Indeed, study after study has emphasized the complimentarity between 
FDI and trade growth (Rajan, 1996a). Thus issues relating to the facilitation of investments must be 
part of any broad-ranging economic cooperative agreement. The JSEPA contains a set of detailed 
provisions on investment promotion and protection aimed at fostering an open international 
environment for cross-border investment and providing access to each other’s markets. Issues 
covered include national treatment, prohibition of performance requirements, expropriation and 
compensation, transfers of profits and other funds, and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
mechanism and procedures. As with trade in services, the agreement spans both citizens and 
permanent residents of Singapore and encompasses firms formed in either Japan or Singapore 
which are owned or controlled by non-Singaporeans/Japanese and “engaged in substantive business 
operations”. Steps have also been put in place to encourage cooperation and business alliances 
between small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) between the two countries so as to gain 
greater market shares in one another’s economies as well as penetrate third countries.     21
 
Trade in services and investments invariably require complimentary movement of natural 
persons. The JSEPA will grant Singaporeans and permanent residents of Singapore guaranteed 
entry and stay in Japan to work and to administer their investments under fairly liberal conditions. 
Similarly, Japanese professionals will be able to practice in Singapore. Measures are also being 
taken towards the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.   
 
4.4  Other Areas of Cooperation 
  Beyond those already stated and other specific ones to promote trade and investments (by 
enhancing facilities for export credit insurance and overseas investment reinsurance), the JSEPA 
has taken steps to: (a) promote mutual recognition of and cooperation with regard to competition 
policies; (b) put in place a set of procedures and regulations pertaining to government procurement; 
(c) undertake collaborative measures and cooperative activities on Intellectual Property (IP); (d) 
step up cooperation in Science and Technology and human resource development; (e) and establish 
provisions for orderly dispute settlement. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
The economic linkages between Japan and Singapore are deep and well established. The 
recently concluded “New Age Economic Partnership” is aimed at fortifying and revitalizing these 
already strong linkages bilaterally as well as promoting joint Japan-Singapore trade and investments 
in third countries. The JSEPA is expected to provide significant mutual benefits to the two 
participating countries. Beyond the gains from the elimination of tariffs on most products, both 
countries can be expected to enjoy cost savings due to less delay from the streamlining and 
harmonization of customs procedures, development of orderly dispute settlement mechanisms, 
paperless trading, and mutual recognition of standards in the area of testing and certification. The 
agreement has also established norms for the liberalisation and facilitation of trade and investment 
in the services sector. Given the relatively low penetration of FDI in this sector in Japan, Singapore,    22
 
which has a growing comparative advantage here, can be expected to reap significant economic 
gains. Specific services that Japan has committed for trade under the JSEPA are professional 
services, construction services, computer services, distribution services, telecommunication 
services, financial services, and transport services. 
Conversely, trade and investment diversion remains a real concern particularly with regard 
to the services sector. This could potentially hurt third countries if not the two countries directly 
concerned. In response, apart from repeatedly asserting the primacy of the multilateral trading 
system
21, policy makers in both Japan and Singapore have often expressed the view that the JSEPA 
is open to other “like-minded” countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the presence 
of these “new” trade issues pertaining to harmonization of investment and intellectual property 
rights regimes as well as the large-scale exclusion of agriculture products does make one doubt the 
extent to which these agreements can be extended to other countries
22. This may, to some extent, 
limit the appropriateness of the JSEPA as a model for future trade arrangements
23. The relatively 
lax and vague WTO rules regarding FTAs ensures that the JSEPA is not inconsistent with them, but 
then again, virtually none of the other 170 trade pacts that dot the global trading system are either. 
 
                                                           
21 For instance, Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, has reportedly noted:  
FTAs should not be pursued at the expense of the multilateral trading system. We must 
continue to invest efforts towards the launch of a New Round (of multilateral trade 
negotiations), to ensure that the gap between FTAs and the WTO does not grow so wide that it 
becomes irreconcilable.” (Business Times, Singapore, December 5, 2000). 
 
22 Indeed, the absence of many sensitive areas between two countries like agriculture and forestry and 
fisheries appears to have been the main reason for Japan’s willingness to embark on an FTA with Singapore. 
Other reasons might include similarity of income levels, geographic proximity as well as Singapore’s 
experience with negotiating agreements with other countries. 
 
23 In fact, while proclaiming the JSEPA as being “forward-looking” and “a model of cooperation for the 
region”, the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi also ruled out the possibility of extending the 
agreement to other Southeast Asian countries citing agriculture access as a potential problem area (Low, 
2002).    23
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Annex 1: Trade Intensity Indices 
a)   Total Trade Intensity 
  The bilateral trade intensity index for total trade is as follows: 
 
 T ij =[(Xij+Mij)/(Xi+Mi)]/{[Xwj+Mwj)-(Xij+Mij)]/[(Xw+Mw)-(Xi+Mi)]}     
 
where: Tij = Total trade intensity index of country i with country j; Xij = Exports of country i to j ; 
Mij = Imports of country i from j; Xi =Total exports of country i; Mi= Total imports of country i; 
Xwj= Total world exports to country j ; Mwj = Total world imports from country j; and Xw = Total 
world exports; Mw = Total world imports. 
This index is interpreted as a relative measure of two ratios. The numerator represents the 
share of bilateral trade between country i and j as a percentage of total trade of country i. This forms 
the numerator of the total trade intensity index. The second ratio in the denominator represents the 
total trade of country j with the world excluding country i as a share of total world trade excluding 
country i. This forms the denominator of the total trade intensity index.  
If the numerator exceeds the denominator, i.e. if the value of Tij > 1, It implies that the 
bilateral trade intensity for country i with country j is greater than in comparison to country i’s trade 
with the rest of the world (ROW). For instance, if Thailand is regarded as country i  and country j is 
represented by its trading partners, viz. US / Japan, then a value of Tij > 1 implies that Thailand 
prefers to trade more intensely with them than trading with the rest of the world.  
 
b)  Export Intensity Index  
The bilateral export intensity index among country i and country j may be stated as follows: 
  
 X ij
a = [Xij/Xi]/[( Mj - Mji)/( Mw- Mi)]    26
 
where: in addition to the notations in the bilateral trade intensity index,  Mj = Total  imports of 
country j and Mji = Imports of country j from country i. A value of this index above unity implies 
that country i’s relative share of exports to country j exceeds country j’s share of imports from the 
ROW. This implies an over-representation of country j in country i’s export market. From country 
i’s point of view, the value of greater than one indicates that country i has relatively more intense 
preference for exporting to country j as compared to country j’s imports from the ROW.  
 
c)  Import Intensity Index  
  The import intensity index may be stated as follows: 
 
 M ij
a = [Mij/Mi]/[(Xj- Xji)/( Xw- Xi)]     
 
where: in addition to the notations in the bilateral trade intensity index, Xj = Total exports of 
country j; and Xji = Exports of country j to country i. A value of this index above unity implies that 
country i’s relative share of imports to country j exceeds country j’s share of exports to the ROW. 
This implies an over-representation of country j in country i’s import market. From country i’s point 
of view, the value of greater than one indicates that country i has relatively more intense preference 
for importing from country j as compared to country j’s exports to the ROW.    27
 
Annex 2:  Measures of Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) 
The Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index is the most common measure of IIT. It measures the ratio of 
net exports in a product category to its total trade in an index that takes values from 0 to 100. It thus 
calculates IIT as a part of balanced trade (overlap between exports and imports) in the total trade in 
a given industry k: 
 
GLk= Xk+Mk - | Xk-Mk|  = 1-  |Xk - Mk|         
                     Xk+ Mk                     Xk+ Mk 
 
Alternatively, the index may be formulated as follows: 
 
G-Lk = [2*min (Xk, Mk)/(Xk + Mk)]*100 
 
It takes a value of zero if either Xk or Mk equals 0, implying no IIT and if Xk=Mk , it implies a value 
of 100 and signifies complete IIT in that industry. This index can be calculated at the aggregate 
level as a weighted average of IIT in all industries, these weights based on the share of the industry 
- specific trade in the country’s total trade. The aggregate G-L index may be stated as follows:  
where: 
  
and  k=1…n for n industries in the economy. In the above equation, G-Lk  represents the weights for 
each product category. However, the G-L index is more of a measure of degree of IIT rather than 
the actual level or volume of IIT. The latter is measured by the following formula (Rajan, 1996):  
 
Level of IIT = 2*min (Xk, Mk) for any industry k. 
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    Notes:    a)  I - Indonesia, H - Hong Kong, K – South Korea, M - Malaysia, P - Philippines,  
   S - Singapore, T - Thailand. Ordinal ranking in descending order of “bad”                   
   fundamentals; b) in SDRs, June 1997; c)  1996; d)  1997; e)  change (%) in 1996  
   less the average  change (%) previous three years; f) June 1997; g)  unclear    
   from  source, but probably  average of 1996 and 1997; h) 1997 estimates; i) May  
   1996;  j) growth of credit to private sector relative to nominal GDP, 1996; k)  June    
   1997; I)   June 1997; m) equal  weights to all fundamentals (including two others  
   included in original sources); n)  greater weights given to fundamentals in which    
   Thailand is weakest 
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Table 2 
Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise Trade, 2000 
(billion US dollars and percentage) 
 
Note:    Data exclude intra-EU trade  









Annual          Annual   
      percentage         percentage 
Rank Exporters Value  Share  change  Rank  Importers  Value  Share  change 
                               
1    Extra-EU exports  858.9  17.3  7.1  1    United States  1257.6  23.9  18.7 
2    United States  781.1  15.7  11.3  2    Extra-EU imports  965.7  18.3  13.2 
3    Japan  479.2  9.6  14.3  3    Japan  379.5  7.2  21.9 
4    Canada  276.6  5.6  16.0  4    Canada  244.8  4.6  11.2 
5    China  249.3  5.0  27.7  5    China  225.1  4.3  35.8 
6    Hong Kong, China  202.4  4.1  16.1  6    Hong Kong, China  214.2  4.1  18.5 
      domestic exports  23.7  0.5  5.8        retained imports  a  35.4  0.7  23.5 
      re-exports  178.8  3.6  17.6  7    Mexico   182.6  3.5  22.9 
7    Korea  172.3  3.5  19.9  8    Korea  160.5  3.0  34.0 
8    Mexico   166.4  3.3  22.0  9    Taipei, Chinese  140.0  2.7  26.2 
9    Taipei, Chinese  148.3  3.0  22.1  10    Singapore  134.5 2.6  21.1 
10    Singapore  137.9  2.8  20.2        retained imports   75.6  1.4  16.2 
      domestic exports  78.9  1.6  14.8           
       re-exports  59.1  1.2  28.5               Table 3 
Top 10 products of Singapore's Total Exports to the World and Japan, 1999 
(million Singapore dollars) 
 
      
   World   
Product Code  Product Description  Value  Share 
776 Electronic  Valves  39028.9  20.1 
752  Data Processing Machines  33530.7  17.3 
759  Parts For Office & D/P Machines  17165.0  8.8 
334  Petroleum Products Refined  14643.5  7.5 
764 Telecommunications  Equipment  8742.0  4.5 
772 Electrical  Circuit  Apparatus  4823.1  2.5 
778  Electrical Machinery N.e.s  4141.0  2.1 
898  Musical Instrument & Parts  3327.4  1.7 
515 Organo-inorganic  Compounds  2799.6  1.4 
931 Special  Transactions  2136.6  1.1 
 Others  63951.8  32.9 
   Total  194289.6  100.0 
      
  Japan    
Product Code  Product Description  Value  Share 
752  Data Processing Machines  3004.3  20.8 
776 Electronic  Valves  2322.8  16.1 
898  Musical Instrument & Parts  1490.0  10.3 
759  Parts For Office & D/P Machines  1103.9  7.7 
334  Petroleum Products Refined  745.6  5.2 
764 Telecommunications  Equipment  378.8  2.6 
931 Special  Transactions  346.7  2.4 
112 Alcoholic  Beverages  331.1  2.3 
772 Electrical  Circuit  Apparatus  211.4  1.5 
716  Electric Plant & Parts N.e.s  196.8  1.4 
 Others  4289.3  29.7 
   Total  14420.7  100.0 
    
Note:   Commodity composition at SITC 3-digit level 

















Top 10 products of Singapore's total imports from the World and Japan, 1999 
(million Singapore dollars) 
 
 
  World    
Product Code  Product Description  Value  Share 
776 Electronic  Valves  37461.1  19.9 
759  Parts For Office & D/P Machines  14856.8  7.9 
333 Petroleum  Crude  9029.2  4.8 
752  Data Processing Machines  8916.3  4.7 
334  Petroleum Products Refined  7980.2  4.2 
764 Telecommunications  Equipment  7298.4  3.9 
772 Electrical  Circuit  Apparatus  5608.4  3.0 
778  Electrical Machinery N.e.s  4782.3  2.5 
792 Aircraft  3782.5  2.0 
874 Measuring  Instruments  3542.7  1.9 
   84884.1  45.1 
Total     188142  100.0 
      
  Japan    
Product Code  Product Description  Value  Share 
776 Electronic  Valves  6844.3  21.8 
764 Telecommunications  Equipment  1654.5  5.3 
759  Parts For Office & D/P Machines  1592.8  5.1 
778  Electrical Machinery N.e.s  1547.8  4.9 
772 Electrical  Circuit  Apparatus  1440.5  4.6 
728  Specialized Machinery N.e.s  1354.0  4.3 
752  Data Processing Machines  1324.1  4.2 
793 Ships  &  Boats  865.2  2.8 
874 Measuring  Instruments  775.3  2.5 
882 Photographic  Supplies  610.7  1.9 
 Others  13313.1  42.5 
   Total  31325  100.0 
      
Note:   Commodity composition at SITC 3-digit level 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exports Imports Total Trade Trade Balance
 











1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Year
Trade intensity with Japan Export intensity with Japan
 
 Source: Computed from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various issues 
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Figure 2b



















Year Japan's Trade intensity with Singapore
Japan's Export intensity with Singapore
 









USA Singapore Europe Japan Others
 
  Source: Economic Development Board (2000b) 































               Source: Calculated from Ministry of Finance, Japan (2002) 
 
Figure 5





































Manufacturing Total Non-Manufacturing Total Total
 
          Source: Calculated from Ministry of Finance, Japan (2002)  
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